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Policing Attorneys: Exclusion of Unethically
Obtained Evidence
In zealously representing their clients, attorneys may be
tempted to violate provisions of the rules of professional responsi-
bility.1 In particular, an attorney may want to talk to an opposing
party without obtaining the consent of the opposing party's coun-
sel or without disclosing to the opposing party that he is an attor-
ney.2 This comment argues that the current disciplinary apparatus
to discourage such conduct is inadequate: it provides no meaning-
ful disincentives to conduct that violates the rules of professional
responsibility. The comment proposes as a solution to the
problems created by courtroom use of evidence obtained by an at-
torney in violation of the rules of professional responsibility that
courts exclude any evidence so obtained. In examining the rules
and the ethical problems associated with evidence obtained by vio-
lating the rules, part I discusses the incentives lawyers have to ob-
' "Rules of professional responsibility" and "rules" are used herein to refer to both sets
of rules that the American Bar Association has promulgated for professional conduct: the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility (1981) ("Model Code" or "Code") and the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct (1983) ("Model Rules" or "Rules").
The Model Code consists of interrelated Canons, Ethical Considerations (ECs), and
Disciplinary Rules (DRs). The Disciplinary Rules state required minimum standards for
lawyers' conduct, the violation of which forms the basis for disciplinary action. See Model
Code, Preliminary Statement. The Canons, Ethical Considerations, and Disciplinary Rules
"define the type of ethical conduct that the public has a right to expect not only of lawyers
but also of their non-professional employees and associates in all matters pertaining to pro-
fessional employment." Id. The Code does not prescribe disciplinary procedures or penal-
ties. Id.
The Model Rules consist of some rules that are imperative, defining proper conduct for
purposes of professional discipline, and others that are permissive and define areas in which
the lawyer has professional discretion. Model Rules Scope [1]. Failure to comply with a
prohibition is a basis for invoking the disciplinary process. Model Rules Scope [5].
The Model Rules were promulgated as a result of criticisms of the Model Code. One
criticism was that the Model Code's three-part format was confusing the Code "tended to
speak with two voices, creating conflict between its description of aspirations on the one
hand and its proscription of certain conduct on the other; a conflict that never has been
adequately resolved. . . ." Robert J. Kutak, The Rules of Professional Conduct in an Era of
Change, 29 Emory L. J. 889, 899 (1980) (footnote omitted) (suggesting that the Code's ethi-
cal considerations are inconsistent with its disciplinary rules).
2 For particular prohibitions, see Model Code DR 7-104(A)(1) (communication with
other party without counsel's consent), 1-102(A)(4) (dishonest conduct); Model Rules, Rule
4.2 (communication with other party without counsel's consent), 4.1 (material false
statements).
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tain evidence improperly, as well as the lack of effective deterrents.
Part II assesses the costs and benefits of using an exclusionary rule
as a solution to the problem of evidence obtained in violation of
the rules and recommends the adoption of an exclusionary rule.
Part III describes the implementation of such a rule, focusing on
exceptions to and the scope of its use.
I. THE TENSION BETWEEN THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY AND OBTAINING EVIDENCE
This section examines how a lawyer's desire to uncover the
strongest evidence for her client may conflict with her professional
responsibilities. In particular, the section explores violations of the
only two rules of professional responsibility that relate directly to
obtaining evidence. Next, the section discusses how current en-
forcement of these rules is both ineffective and costly. It concludes
with a review of the strong arguments for vigorous enforcement of
the rules of professional responsibility that relate to obtaining
evidence.
A. Incentives to Violate the Rules: An Illustration
Consider an ordinary products liability action, involving defec-
tive widgets, brought by an individual (Client) against a corporate
defendant (Defendant). The defendant's counsel (Counsel) files re-
sponsive pleadings and motions. The plaintiff's attorney (Attor-
ney) visits Defendant's employee (Inventor) who designed the wid-
gets. Attorney states his name and asks Inventor questions about
the widgets' design without informing Inventor that he is an attor-
ney and is representing Client in the products liability case. Attor-
ney also fails to inform Counsel or ask Counsel's permission to
speak with Inventor. Inventor answers Attorney's questions, and
Attorney tape records the conversation.
Attorney's actions save Attorney and Client time and money.
Informally obtaining a statement from Inventor is far faster (and
thus Attorney's fees are reduced) than taking a deposition with op-
posing counsel present to object to questions. Such informal inter-
views also are more likely to produce incriminating statements for
two reasons. First, Inventor may be less guarded in his answers
without Counsel present to warn him of the legal significance of his
admissions. Second, without Counsel present, Attorney may more
easily use tactics such as leading questions to trick or confuse In-
ventor. Thus, by obtaining this type of informal statement, Attor-
ney not only saves time but also may gain some advantage at trial
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or in settlement negotiations.
Of course, in the process of obtaining Inventor's statement,
Attorney has violated at least one, and possibly two, rules of pro-
fessional responsibility. He has communicated with a witness (In-
ventor) without informing him of Attorney's relation to the litiga-
tion.3 And if Inventor has managerial responsibility, Attorney may
have violated another rule by failing either to give notice to Coun-
sel or to obtain Counsel's consent.4 Despite the violation of rules of
professional responsibility, courts generally admit evidence ob-
tained in a manner similar to that described above, rather than
excluding it as proposed in this comment.5
B. Ineffective Enforcement of the Rules
The legal system currently relies heavily upon state bar disci-
plinary proceedings to serve as a deterrent to attorney misconduct.
Each state has its own disciplinary apparatus.6 In practically all
states, violations of the rules of professional responsibility are sup-
posed to be reported either to state grievance boards or to local or
state bar associations that investigate the complaint and take ap-
propriate action. But lawyers seldom complain to these discipli-
nary agencies about other attorneys' violations of professional
"Even if the witness is an employee of the defendant, it is ethical for the attorney for
the claimant to interview the witness so long as he or she practices no deception and in-
forms the witness that he or she is the attorney for the claimant." American Bar Founda-
tion, Annotated Code of Professional Responsibility 335 (1979) ("ABA Annotated Code"),
quoting ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Opin-
ion 117 (Aug. 27, 1934) (emphasis added).
Model Code DR 7-104(A)(1); Model Rules, Rule 4.2. For example, Model Code DR 7-
104 states:
(A) During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall not:
(1) Communicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of the represen-
tation with a party he knows to be represented by a lawyer in that matter unless
he has the prior consent of the lawyer representing such other party or is author-
ized by law to do so.
Similarly, Model Rule 4.2 provides that "[i]n representing a client, a lawyer shall not com-
municate about the subject of the representation with a party the lawyer knows to be repre-
sented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other
lawyer or is authorized by law to do so."
5 See, e.g., Ross v. City of Geneva, 43 11. App. 3d 976, 985, 357 N.E.2d 829, 836-37
(1976): "While we, like plaintiff, are concerned with the practice of contacting members of
the opposing class, which presents the opportunity to misrepresent the nature and effect of
the class action and to encourage defection, we have found no Illinois rule or case law which
would allow us to exclude such evidence. We therefore decline to exclude this evidence."
' See M. Bays Schoaf, State Disciplinary Enforcement Systems Structural Survey
(1980).
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standards,7 and laymen often lack the knowledge to spot violations
or do not know to whom to report them.8 Moreover, even if viola-
tions are reported, the disciplinary actions these agencies under-
take are often ineffective and very costly.9
For example, during 1983, in the ten states (including the Dis-
trict of Columbia) having the largest numbers of practicing law-
yers, at least 30,000 complaints resulted in the imposition of
roughly 1,700 sanctions. 10 The probability of any particular lawyer
being sanctioned in a given year was thus quite low, ranging from
0.002 to 0.009 per lawyer. The administrative cost of the sanctions
was very high, ranging from just over $6,000 per sanction imposed
in New York to almost $24,000 per sanction in California."- More
specifically, in California, Illinois, Michigan, and New York City
during 1974 and 1975, between 91 and 97 percent of all complaints
received were dismissed without investigation.1 2
These figures reveal a serious problem, particularly in the area
of administrative costs, but they may not reflect the full extent of
the problem. Many experts believe that actual incidents of attor-
ney misconduct are significantly underreported, 3 though evidence
7 ABA Special Comm. on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement, Problems and Rec-
ommendations in Disciplinary Enforcement 167-68 (1970) ("1970 ABA Report"). Attorneys
and judges who observe misconduct often do not regularly report it. F. Raymond Marks and
Darlene Cathcart, Discipline Within the Legal Profession, in Michael Davis and Frederick
A. Elliston, eds., Ethics and the Legal Profession 62, 72 (1986).
8 One professor summarized the problem: "Misconduct is rarely perceived. If per-
ceived, it is not reported. If reported, it is not investigated. If investigated, violations are not
found. If found, they are excused. If they are not excused, penalties are light." Richard L.
Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 Tex. L. Rev. 639, 648 (1981) (foot-
notes omitted).
9 For charges that the disciplinary procedures are inadequate because they are con-
trolled by members of the bar, and that the process is decentralized and overly concerned
with protecting the "unjustly accused lawyer," see Marks and Cathcart, Discipline Within
the Legal Profession, in Davis and Elliston, eds., Ethics at 72-73 (cited in note 7).
10 Those jurisdictions are, in decreasing order of lawyer population: California, New
York, Illinois, Texas, the District of Columbia, Ohio, Florida, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts,
and New Jersey. Approximately 411,000 lawyers practice in those jurisdictions. Standing
Comm. on Professional Discipline and the American Bar Association Center for Professional
Responsibility, Statistical Report Re: Expense, Case Volume, and Staffing of Lawyer Disci-
plinary Enforcement in State Jurisdictions During 1983, Chart I (Sept. 1984) ("1983 ABA
Statistical Report").
11 Eric H. Steele and Raymond T. Nimmer, Lawyers, Clients and Professional Regula-
tion, 1976 Amer. Bar Found. Research J. 917, 982.
12 1983 ABA Statistical Report at Chart I (number of sanctions), Chart III (disciplinary
budget) (cited in note 10).
13 See F. Raymond Marks and Darlene Cathcart, Discipline Within the Legal Profes-
sion: Is it Self-Regulation?, 1974 U. Ill. L. Forum 193, 207 (1974). Consider also Abel, 59
Tex. L. Rev. at 648 (cited in note 8); Steele and Nimmer, 1976 Amer. Bar Found. Research
J. at 946 (cited in note 11) (noting variations among jurisdictions in number of reports per
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for this view is wholly anecdotal.14
Even for those violations that are reported, most experts agree
that current disciplinary methods are ineffective. For example, the
ABA Committee on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement re-
ported that "[w]ith few exceptions, the prevailing attitude of law-
yers toward disciplinary enforcement ranges from apathy to out-
right hostility. Disciplinary action is practically nonexistent in
many jurisdictions; practices and procedures are antiquated; many
disciplinary agencies have little power to take effective steps
against malefactors.' ' 5 As a result, only the most egregious ethics
violations are investigated and punished.16 Even where disciplinary
agencies have the will and the authority, they frequently fail to
take action because they lack the necessary funds.17
Whatever the reason, enforcement of the rules of professional
responsibility is lax. One way to attack the problem of ineffective
enforcement is to provide more money for disciplinary agencies. In
the ten states with the highest populations of lawyers, a positive
correlation exists between disciplinary expenditures per lawyer and
the frequency with which sanctions are imposed.'" This suggests
that some instances of misbehavior may be going unpunished: if
the level of expenditure were sufficient to allow detection and pros-
ecution of every violation of the rules of professional responsibility,
one would expect to find no positive correlation between expendi-
tures per lawyer and frequency of sanctions.'
lawyer).
4 American Bar Association Commission on Professionalism, " . . . In the Spirit of
Public Service": A Blueprint for the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism 65 & n.120
(1986) (citing testimony by the United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois
and the Administrator of the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission).
"s 1970 ABA Report at 1 (cited in note 7), reprinted in Geoffrey C. Hazard and
Deborah L. Rhode, The Legal Profession: Responsibility and Regulation 428 (1985).
"' Deborah L. Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers: A Functional Perspective on Professional
Codes, 59 Tex. L. Rev. 689, 718 (1981). At least until recently, the few cases that resulted in
disciplinary proceedings usually involved unfair professional competition, criminal miscon-
duct, gross incompetence, or stealing a client's funds, and they usually resulted in only mild
sanctions. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Ethics in the Practice of Law 59 (1978).
17 1970 ABA Report at 2 (cited in note 7) ("[S]tate disciplinary agencies are underman-
ned and underfinanced, many having no staff whatever for the investigation or prosecution
of complaints.").
1S 1983 ABA Statistical Report at Chart I (number of lawyers and sanctions), Chart I
(disciplinary budget) (cited in note 10). For example, during 1983, Florida spent about $68
per licensed lawyer on disciplinary investigation and procedures and imposed .009 sanctions
per lawyer. At the other extreme, the District of Columbia spent about $27 per lawyer and
imposed fewer than .002 sanctions per lawyer. Id. at Chart L
" Indeed, in theory, if sufficient funds were available to make detection and prosecu-
tion of each violation a certainty, the resulting deterrent effect might actually lead to a
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However, the solution to curbing attorney misconduct is not
simply to provide more funding under the current enforcement
system. First, it would be very expensive, and thus perhaps politi-
cally unpalatable, for states to allocate enough additional funds to
enforcement to curtail attorney misconduct substantially. Second,
while more funding may improve the effectiveness of disciplinary
proceedings, it will do little to ensure that more violations are re-
ported. More frequent imposition of sanctions will not necessarily
enhance the incentives or abilities of attorneys or laypersons to re-
port rule violations, since they will gain nothing from the
sanctions.
As long as disciplinary proceedings are separate from the un-
derlying legal proceedings, violations are not likely to be reported
because few incentives exist for anyone, especially other attorneys,
to look for and to report violations. An opposing attorney reporting
a violation derives no benefits for himself or his client, since no
award of damages will result. Further, there are significant costs to
reporting: a reporting attorney will incur the antagonism of the at-
torney against whom he reports and with whom he may have to
work in the future. And to report violations by one's colleague may
undermine general camaraderie in the profession and may itself be
stigmatizing, especially among lawyers practicing in a particular lo-
cation or specialty.
Further, the primary purpose of disciplinary proceedings is
not to punish improper conduct. "They are not for the purpose of
punishment, but rather seek to determine the fitness of an officer
of the court to continue in that capacity.. . .1,0 Rarely has a state
disbarred or suspended an attorney for the kinds of violations of
the rules of professional responsibility at issue here. Such serious
sanctions are directed mostly at attorneys who disserve their cli-
ents (through negligence or misappropriation of funds) or who are
convicted of criminal behavior.21 Thus, the threat of disciplinary
reduction in the level of rule violations, and thus in the number of sanctions because attor-
neys would choose to avoid violating the rules out of fear of prosecution. This clearly has
not occurred yet. Therefore, the need for less costly deterrents, such as the rule proposed in
this comment, i§ still pressing. For raw data, see id. at Chart I, Chart m.
20 ABA Standards For Lawyer Discipline and Disability Proceedings, Standard 1.1
Commentary (1983) ("ABA Discipline Standards"), citing In re Echeles, 430 F.2d 347, 349
(7th Cir. 1970).
21 For example, in the 1960s and 1970s in six large states and New York City, offenses
against clients accounted for between 33 and 75 percent of serious public disciplinary sanc-
tions, criminal convictions for between 10 and 28 percent. See Steele and Nimmer, 1976
Amer. Bar Found. Research J. at 995 (cited in note 11) (statistics for California, Florida,
Michigan, New York, New York City, Texas, and Wisconsin).
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proceedings appears to provide an inadequate deterrent to attor-
ney misconduct of the type addressed in this comment.2"
Better enforcement is desirable. There are significant benefits
inherent in the rules of professional responsibility.23 Moreover,
without effective enforcement, attorneys who follow the rules may
be placed at a disadvantage compared to attorneys who violate the
rules without fear of being punished.24
C. Rationales for the Rules
1. The prohibition against communication without consent
of counsel. Several benefits result from the rule prohibiting com-
munication with a represented party without his attorney's pres-
ence or consent. First, the prohibition against communication pro-
tects the integrity of attorney-client relationships because it
prevents one attorney from interfering with an opposing party's re-
lationship with his counsel. While the rule may be attacked by
cynics as an example of how members of the legal profession pro-
tect their own economic interests, 25 its primary purpose is to pro-
tect the interests of clients, who might otherwise fall prey to cajol-
ing opposing counsel whose interests are directly opposed to those
of the clients. This protection is vital in the early stages of litiga-
tion, when a client least understands his case. In criminal prosecu-
tions, for example, Supreme Court decisions have extended de-
fendants' right to counsel under the sixth amendment and the due
process clause to pretrial stages, reasoning that a defendant needs
the "guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings
11 A judge imposing the exclusionary sanction on an attorney should nevertheless re-
port the attorney to the appropriate disciplinary authority. See ABA Standing Comm. on
Professional Discipline and the Center for Professional Responsibility, The Judicial Re-
sponse to Lawyer Misconduct V.3 (1984).
13 See part I-C below.
2 [W]hether one is likely to be caught for violating an ethical standard says nothing
about the merit of the standard. However, if the low probability of punishment means
that many lawyers will violate the standard, the standard becomes even more difficult
for the honest lawyer to follow, for by doing so he may be forfeiting a significant advan-
tage for his client to others who do not follow the rules.
James J. White, Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in Negotiation, 1980
Amer. Bar Found. Research J. 926, 927.
"I Some would argue that the rule's primary purpose is to enlarge the market for attor-
neys' services and to protect them from competition once they have secured a client. At-
tacks on various ethical rules as devices for obtaining and retaining market power have been
frequent. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 377-78 (1977) (striking down a state bar
prohibition on attorney advertising as violating attorneys' first amendment rights to engage
in commercial speech); Philip Shuchman, Ethics and Legal Ethics: The Propriety of the
Canons as a Group Moral Code, 37 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 244, 250-56, 268 (1968).
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against him."2 And, as demonstrated in Gideon v. Wainwright,27
the courts have come to view the lawyer as a necessity in protect-
ing a criminal defendant's rights.
In civil cases, although the sixth amendment does not apply,
the right to choose one's own counsel has nevertheless been recog-
nized, 28 and the attorney-client relationship is protected, for exam-
ple, by the attorney-client privilege. The prohibition on communi-
cation operates in part to protect the attorney-client relationship,
just as the sixth amendment (in criminal cases) and the attorney-
client privilege (in all cases) protects this relationship.
The rule against communication is particularly compelling
where a party has chosen to have counsel in a criminal or civil
case, because the party's decision to retain counsel reflects his
judgment that a lawyer will be both helpful and protective and
that he is unable without such aid to best protect his interests. Of
course, if a client decides that he would rather save the attorneys'
fees, or that he can best represent his interests himself, he is free
to dismiss his attorney and deal directly with opposing counsel.
But "[o]nce a person has enlisted the aid of a lawyer, he is entitled
to all the benefits that flow from that choice."29
The rule against communication has greater significance when
one considers that, at least in criminal cases, defendants have a
right to the effective assistance of counsel. Just as a criminal de-
fendant is denied effective assistance of counsel if subjected to
post-indictment interrogation without an attorney,30 so too may a
'" Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932). See U.S. Const. amend. VI; Coleman v.
Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970):
[T]he guiding hand of counsel at the preliminary hearing is essential to protect the
indigent accused against an erroneous or improper prosecution. First, the lawyer's
skilled examination and cross-examination of witnesses may expose fatal weaknesses in
the state's case.. . . [T]he skilled interrogation of witnesses by an experienced lawyer
can fashion a vital impeachment tool for use in cross-examination ... or preserve tes-
timony... of a witness who does not appear at the trial.. . . [T]rained counsel can
more effectively discover the case the State has against his client and make possible the
preparation of a proper defense ....
27 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963): "That government hires lawyers to prosecute and defen-
dants who have the money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of the wide-
spread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries. The right of one
charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in
some countries, but it is in ours."
28 See, e.g., In re American Cable Publications, Inc., 768 F.2d 1194, 1196-97 (10th Cir.
1985); In re Northern Dist. of Cal., Dalkon Shield, etc., 693 F.2d 847, 851 (9th Cir. 1982).
29 Lewis Kurlantzik, The Prohibition on Communication with an Adverse Party, 51
Conn. Bar J. 136, 151 (1977).
3O Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 204-05 (1963) (the Constitution requires "ef-
fective" representation of counsel, which includes representation during the interrogation of
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party to a civil case be deprived of effective legal assistance if he is
interviewed prior to trial without his attorney present. First, the
attorney will be unable to advise his client at the time and prevent
him from injuring his case, for example, by revealing information
protected by a privilege. Second, the attorney will be unable to
prevent the opposing attorney from using improper tactics (such as
leading questions) and will not be able to witness whether the op-
posing attorney has misled the client. If the attorney is present, he
may be able either to prevent such behavior or later to demon-
strate that such behavior occurred."' Thus, the prohibition against
communication protects the attorney's ability to champion his cli-
ent's cause effectively.
The benefits of counsel described above can be summarized by
characterizing counsel's role as that of a shield protecting his client
throughout the litigation and negotiation processes.3 2 Counsel pre-
vents his client from falling into traps laid by opposing counsel s
and guides his client through the complicated technicalities of the
law's procedural system.3 4 The layman client is in a poor position
to analyze his case or to evaluate meaningfully what the opposing
counsel tells him.3 5
Further, the attorney takes responsibility for many details of
the litigation so that the client need not pay constant attention to
the lawsuit. This serves another goal of the legal system-to ensure
that lawsuits are not too onerous or time-consuming for parties to
continue in their normal businesses. Accordingly, the attorney
takes over most of the burdens of the lawsuit, and part of his role
is to protect the client from unnecessary harassment by the oppos-
ing party.36
an indicted defendant, not just during his trial).
3, See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237 (1967) (attorney presence at "lineup"
identification procedure necessary to protect against suggestibility of witnesses).
3 The rationale for the prohibition on communication is that the legal system "func-
tions best when persons in need of legal advice or assistance are represented by their own
counsel." American Bar Foundation, Annotated Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-18
at 332 (1979).
3 See, e.g., United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 317 (1973), quoting United States v.
Bennett, 409 F.2d 888 (2d Cir. 1969) ("[C]ounsel is ... to be provided to prevent the de-
fendant himself from falling into traps devised by a lawyer on the other side.. .
See e.g., Ash, 413 U.S. at 307.
3s See, e.g., Kurlantzik, 51 Conn. Bar J. at 141 (cited in note 29). In light of this imbal-
ance, "the notion of an 'informed' waiver as an exemption to the communication rule ap-
pears as at best problematic." Id. at 141 n.14.
56 The attorney is helped in this role by Fed. Rule Civil Proc. 26(c), which provides for
protective orders and includes among its express purposes the protection of a "'party or
person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression or undue burden or expense."' Seattle
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The prohibition against communication also helps to prevent
attorneys from misleading opposing parties with impunity. Al-
lowing communication would make it virtually impossible to police
misleading behavior by attorneys because often there would be no
witnesses other than the party who has been misled, who is a poor
witness.3 7 Since the lawyer may be unlikely to deal with an oppos-
ing lay party in any other litigation, and since the opposing party
may have infrequent litigation needs, the "possible diminution in
the lawyer's reputation for fair dealing will probably not be a ma-
jor constraint on his behavior."38 The adversarial relationship also
lacks "reversibility"-that is, the roles of lawyer and opposing lay-
man are not likely ever to be reversed-so incentives for fair deal-
ing are reduced.3 9
Since some prohibited communications are not harmful, and
since they may uncover information material to the dispute, the
court might try to identify in each case whether the communica-
tion was helpful or harmful, to avoid tossing out the good with the
bad. But a prophylactic rule forbidding communications entirely is
preferable to such case-by-case determinations. Detection of attor-
ney misbehavior that takes advantage of opposing parties is diffi-
cult and imperfect. Thus, the likelihood of abuse would be higher
under the case-by-case approach:
To keep clear of the need to make difficult hindsight judg-
ments of fairness in every situation and to remove, or at least
Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 35 n.21 (1984).
Courts also award attorneys' fees to discourage actions that are vexatious, malicious, or
in bad faith, or that are taken for oppressive reasons. Copeland v. Martinez, 603 F.2d 981,
984 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n v. Datapoint Corp., 457 F. Supp. 62,
69 (W.D. Tex. 1978). For the same reason, "[d]epositions are scheduled at times and places
most convenient to those involved." Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 33 n.19. Under our legal
system, lawsuits are not supposed to consume the litigants, as did Jarndyce v. Jarndyce in
Dickens's Bleak House at 72-73 (Morton Zabel, ed. 1956):
"The Lawyers have twisted it into such a state of bedevilment that the original merits
of the case have long disappeared from the face of the earth. It's about a Win, and the
trusts under a Will-or it was, once. It's about nothing but Costs, now. We are always
appearing, and disappearing, and swearing, and interrogating, and filing, and cross-
filing, and arguing, and sealing, and motioning, and referring, and reporting, and re-
volving about the Lord Chancellor and all his satellites, and equitably waltzing our-
selves off to dusty death, about Costs.. . . And thus, through years and years, and lives
and lives, everything goes on, constantly beginning over and over again, and nothing
ever ends. And we can't get out of the suit on any terms, for we are made parties to it,
and must be parties to it, whether we like it or not."
37 Kurlantzik, 51 Conn. Bar J. at 141 (cited in note 29) ("[T]he layman [himself] may
well not detect or appreciate, for some time, the fact that he has been misguided.").
Id. at 140.
3, Id.
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reduce, the risk of overreaching, we pay this price [i.e., pre-
vention of communications which would produce a perfectly
fair resolution of a dispute] for a broad, prophylactic rule. It
seems a tolerable price, particularly in light of the fact that on
balance what can be said for permitting communications does
not appear to be very substantial. 0
In addition to the other costs of having attorneys act as in-
termediaries between parties, 1 there is a possibility that the
court's truth-finding function will be frustrated because the oppos-
ing attorney and his client may prevent the acquisition of material
information that would have come out in the prohibited communi-
cations. However, as discussed in part II-C below, the prohibited
communications may be of questionable reliability. Thus, the ben-
efits of a broad rule against communication outweigh its costs.
2. The prohibition against misrepresentation. Some of the
aforementioned rationales in favor of the prohibition against com-
munications also apply to the prohibition against misrepresenta-
tion and misleading behavior by attorneys. The desire for a legal
system that is as unburdensome and efficient as possible is also
frustrated by misrepresentation and misleading behavior. The
more such practices go unchecked, the more people will fear that
resorting to the legal system will result in unpleasant and possibly
detrimental encounters with unscrupulous attorneys. The rules
against misrepresentation and misleading behavior preserve public
confidence in the legal system, assuring that individuals will not be
discouraged from bringing valid suits or defending against invalid
ones.
The rule against misrepresentation of an attorney's relation to
a case also helps to ensure that all parties are on fair notice as to
the significance of their conversations. This generally will work to
increase the accuracy of statements made in such conversations.
Most people take greater care when speaking for the record. Re-
sponses induced by misrepresentation or trickery, on the other
hand, are likely to be less precisely worded and hence may be less
accurate, particularly when only one party's attorney asks ques-
tions and the opposing party's attorney has no opportunity to fol-
low up and clarify the meaning of the responses.42 Moreover, if a
40 Id. at 143-44.
4, These costs include the administrative costs and the agency costs of representation
of litigants by attorneys. Id. at 154-55.
4' This rationale parallels one of the rationales for exclusion of hearsay evidence. Hear-
say evidence is excluded because out-of-court statements usually are not made with as high
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party has an inclination to lie, he may be more likely to suppress it
and to tell the truth if he knows he is talking to a lawyer who is
familiar with the case and who might turn his untruthfulness
against him later. Of course, if a witness has something to hide,
providing him with notice will enable him to be careful to speak so
as to conceal his secret. Thus, the rule against misrepresentation
clearly increases the likelihood of accurate memory, perception,
and narration, while it is uncertain whether it increases or de-
creases the likelihood of sincerity. The relative importance of these
concerns will vary from case to case. But on balance, despite some
risk of insincerity, the prohibition against misrepresentation seems
worthy of enforcement.
II. EXCLUDING EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF THE
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
This section first examines the power of federal and state
courts to enforce the rules of professional responsibility by exclud-
ing evidence obtained in violation of them. Then, surveying the
benefits from the courts' exercise of this power, the section sug-
gests that adoption of such an exclusionary rule will serve the ends
of deterrence and judicial integrity, the same goals identified by
the Supreme Court at various times to justify the use of exclusion-
ary rules in fourth, fifth, and sixth amendment cases.43 In addition,
a level of seriousness and accuracy as those made in court, where the solemnity of the pro-
ceedings can be impressed on the witness and the opposing side may pose questions to clar-
ify the meaning of responses. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298 (1973).
43 The Supreme Court has recognized exclusion as a valid (indeed mandatory) judicial
remedy for police violations of the fourth, fifth, and sixth amendments' protections with
respect to search and seizure, self-incrimination, and the right to counsel. See, e.g., Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (search and seizure); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)
(confession obtained in violation of right against self-incrimination); Wade, 388 U.S. at 218
(identification of defendant by witness in violation of right to counsel).
A common argument for such rules has been that courts would sanction constitutional
violations if they countenanced use of such illegally-obtained evidence. In Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), the Court adopted an exclusionary rule for federal criminal
proceedings, holding that papers obtained without a warrant from the defendant's home by
federal officers could not be used at trial and should have been returned to the defendant.
The Court stated: "To sanction such proceedings would be to affirm by judicial decision a
manifest neglect if not an open defiance of the prohibitions of the Constitution, intended for
the protection of the people against such unauthorized action." 232 U.S. at 394. For other
cases justifying the exclusionary rule as a safeguard of judicial integrity, consider United
States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 458 n.35 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 356-
60, 363-64 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1968); Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222-23 (1960). On the other hand, several Supreme Court cases
have suggested that the primary justification for the exclusionary rule is that it deters un-
lawful police conduct by eliminating any gains to be realized from it. See Calandra, 414 U.S.
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an exclusionary rule will facilitate policing of the rules of profes-
sional responsibility by the legal profession itself. This will reduce
the frequency of attorney misconduct without increasing the al-
ready substantial administrative costs of the current system of dis-
ciplinary sanctions.
A. The Power of Courts to Implement an Exclusionary Rule
Exclusionary rules are an appropriate means of enforcing legal
requirements or, as in this instance, creating behavioral incentives.
Courts have adopted exclusionary sanctions to accomplish pur-
poses having little or no relation to the truthfulness or probative
value of the evidence involved. For example, in order to avoid cre-
ating disincentives to repair after an accident or injury has oc-
curred, courts have excluded evidence of subsequent repairs when
such evidence is offered to prove negligence or culpable conduct."
As one court has explained: "The desirability of deterring im-
proper conduct is a matter which a court can properly consider in
exercising its discretion as to the exclusion of evidence. ' 45
Further, while violations of the rules of professional responsi-
bility are handled primarily through the disciplinary apparatus,
courts often use their powers to enforce certain provisions of these
rules-particularly the provisions with respect to conflicts of inter-
est and maintenance of client confidences. For example, courts fre-
quently disqualify an attorney who attempts to represent a party
at 347; Janis, 428 U.S. at 446; Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976).
Recently, however, the Court has appeared increasingly dissatisfied with the exclusion-
ary rule, at least in fourth amendment cases. See, e.g., Stone, 428 U.S. at 485 (significantly
limiting habeas corpus review of fourth amendment claims) ("While courts, of course, must
ever be concerned with preserving the integrity of the judicial process, this concern has
limited force as a justification for the exclusion of highly probative evidence."); id. at 499
(Burger, C.J., concurring) (arguing that the "imperative of judicial integrity" has "not with-
stood analysis as more and more critical appraisals of the [exclusionary] rule's operation
have appeared"). See also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913 (1984) (announcing ex-
ception to exclusionary rule when police rely on a warrant's validity in good faith).
Of course, any analogy to the exclusionary rules followed in criminal cases is imperfect.
First, the benefits of exclusion where constitutional violations have occurred are clearly
greater than in the professional responsibility context. Protection of fundamental rights en-
shrined in the Constitution would seem more important than enforcement of the rules of
professional responsibility, and there is something particularly troubling about the state rat-
ifying through its courts the illegal behavior of its law enforcement officials. On the other
hand, the costs of exclusion are also greater in the context of criminal procedure, since ap-
plication of the rule may result in acquittal of a guilty criminal. Therefore, some criticisms
of the constitutional exclusionary rule may be less powerful in the context of professional
responsibility. See note 102 and accompanying text below.
" Fed. Rule Evid. 407.
" Kenyatta v. Kelly, 375 F. Supp. 1175, 1179 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
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opposing the attorney's former client in a matter "substantially re-
lated" to the former representation." Courts have held that viola-
tions of any of a number of Canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility may serve as the basis of disqualification.4"
However, although courts regularly have enforced many provi-
sions of the Code of Professional Responsibility through judicial
sanctions, they have rarely used sanctions to enforce the provision
barring communications with opposing parties represented by
counsel without notifying counsel4" or the provisions prohibiting
attorney conduct involving dishonesty or misrepresentation.49 Ex-
cluding evidence obtained in violation of this part of the Code or
the parallel provisions of the Rules would remedy this gap in
enforcement.
1. State courts' power to exclude unethically obtained evi-
dence. Most states have adopted the Model Code, ' although as of
November, 1986, sixteen states had adopted the Model Rules.50
California has its own Rules of Professional Conduct.51 In many
states, the Code or Rules have been adopted as Rules of Court by
the state's highest court 52 or have been approved by that court.5 3
48 See, e.g., Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994, 998 (9th Cir. 1980); Brennan's, Inc. v. Bren-
nan's Restaurants, Inc., 590 F.2d 168, 171 (5th Cir. 1979); Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d
568, 572 (2d Cir. 1975); Emle Industries, Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 570-71 (2d Cir.
1973). The "substantial relation" test was first articulated by Judge Weinfeld in T.C. Thea-
tre Corp v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 113 F. Supp. 266 (S.D. N.Y. 1953).
See also United States v. Snyder, 707 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that the profes-
sional responsibility rules require disqualification of an attorney indicted for the same crime
as his client).
11 See Model Code Canon 1 (maintaining the integrity and competence of the legal
profession), Canon 4 (preserving confidences and secrets of a client), Canon 5 (exercising
independent professional judgment), Canon 6 (representing a client competently), Canon 7
(representing a client zealously within the bounds of the law), and Canon 9 (avoiding even
the appearance of professional impropriety). For cases approving disqualification, see Trone,
621 F.2d at 999 (citing all these canons); Emle Industries, 478 F.2d at 574 (citing Canon 4);
Ex parte Taylor Coal Co., Inc., 401 So. 2d 1, 5-7 (Ala. 1981) (citing Canons 4 and 9); Snyder,
707 F.2d at 145 (citing Canon 9); Hull, 513 F.2d at 571 (citing Canon 9).
48 See Model Code DR 7-104.
11 See id. at DR 1-102. A few federal courts have barred evidence obtained in violation
of the rules of professional responsibility in criminal cases. See note 66 below.
"o These states are Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Mary-
land, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Nevada,
North Carolina, and Washington. Interview with George Kuhlman, American Bar Associa-
tion (Nov. 1986), updating American Bar Association, The Status of the Model Rules in 53
Jurisdictions (Oct. 9, 1985). Lisa Milord and George Kuhlman of the ABA provided helpful
assistance in locating sources and figures.
51 Thomas D. Rotunda and Ronald D. Rotunda, Professional Responsibility: Problems
and Materials 28 (3d ed. 1984).
" Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nevada, New Hamp-
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In others, a state statute adopts the Code. 4 In some states, the
state bar itself formally adopts the Code,55 although in a few the
state's highest court can amend or enforce it. e
Where a state adopts the Code as part of its statutory law or
where the state's highest court promulgates Rules of Court and
adopts the Model Code or Model Rules as such, state courts clearly
have the power to enforce the rules of professional responsibility,
either as state law or as Rules of Court. In some states rules estab-
lished by the state supreme court have the force of law.57 In states
where the highest court has not adopted the Code or Rules, the
courts still enforce provisions of the Code adopted by the bar. For
example, courts in such states disqualify attorneys for conflicts of
interest in violation of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility.5 Significantly, a judge's discretion is broad enough to
allow him to exclude evidence when its probative value is out-
weighed by its potential for undue prejudice in the fact finding
process. 59 Thus, it is plain that state courts have the power to en-
shire, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and with respect to the Dis-
trict of Columbia, the D.C. Court of Appeals. Interview with Lisa Milord, ABA Standing
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Nov. 1985. See, e.g., Ariz. S. Ct. Rule 42
(1985); Ark. S. Ct. Rules (1985); Del. S. Ct. Rule 61 (1984); Fla. Rules of Court (1986); Ind.
S. Ct. Order of Mar. 8, 1971; Iowa S. Ct. Order of Oct. 4, 1971; Ky. S. Ct. Rule 3.130 (1986);
Mo. S. Ct. Rule 4 (1984); S.C. S. Ct. Rule 32 (1977); Va. S. Ct. Rule pt. 6, § 11 (1986); Wis. S.
Ct. Rules ch. 20 (1986).
53 Colorado, South Dakota. Interview with Lisa Milord, Nov. 1985.
54 Kansas is one of these states. Id. See Kan. Stat. 7-125 (Rule 225).
15 This has occurred in Connecticut, Idaho, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Ne-
braska, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, and Utah. Interview with Lisa Milord,
Nov. 1985.
"6 Alabama and Wyoming have followed this approach. Id. See Ala. S. Ct. Rules 1, 2
(1984).
5 See, e.g., Cunningham v. Long, 125 Me. 494, 496, 135 A. 198, 199 (1926).
" See Gray v. State, 469 So.2d 1252, 1254-55 (Miss. 1985) (disqualifying district attor-
ney since he had previously represented or had been consulted professionally by the accused
with respect to the charges against him; citing Canons 4, 5, 9); Margulies by Margulies v.
Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195, 1202-04 (Utah 1985) (holding that conflict of interest involving
representation of a limited partnership required disqualification; finding violations of Can-
ons 4, 5 and 9); Taylor Coal Co., 401 So.2d at 7 (no violation of Canons 4 and 9 of the Code
so writ directing judge to disqualify attorney denied); G.A.C. Commercial Corp. v. Mahoney
Typographers, Inc., 66 Mich. App. 186, 191, 238 N.W.2d 575, 577 (1975) (disqualifying law
firm for breach of Canon 9 by hiring an attorney who represented the opposing party); Bras-
seaux v. Girouard, 214 So.2d 401, 404-05 (La. App. 1968) (relying on Canon 6 of the ABA
Canons of Professional Ethics to reverse trial court decision refusing to disqualify law firm
when conflict of interest arose with client the firm formerly had represented).
1, See, e.g., Cal. Evid. Code § 352. See also Sappenfield v. Main St. 8 A.P.R. Co., 91
Cal. 48, 61-63, 27 P. 590, 593-94 (1891), where the court required exclusion of evidence of
subsequent repairs, and which was later codified in Cal. Evid. Code § 1151. Cal. Evid. Code
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force the rules through sanctions; in fact, the American Bar Associ-
ation has suggested that "[u]lItimate and exclusive responsibility
within a state for the structure and administration of the lawyer
discipline ... system and the disposition of individual cases is
within the inherent power of the highest court of the state." 0
Recognizing this authority, in Bruske v. Arnold,1 the Illinois
Supreme Court upheld a trial court's exclusion of a statement
given by the defendant to a private investigator hired by the plain-
tiff's counsel. The investigator obtained the statement after the de-
fendant had retained counsel, and the plaintiff was aware that the
defendant had counsel.6 2 The Illinois Supreme Court noted that
the rationale proffered for admissibility was the importance of as-
certaining the truth, but it held that this concern must yield to the
rules of discovery and the canons of ethics: "[The r]ules, however,
to be effective must carry an appropriate sanction; otherwise, the
orderly process of a lawsuit is left to thd mercy of the individual's
sense of justice. We deem that the appropriate sanction in this in-
stance was the exclusion from evidence of the statement. '63
2. Federal courts' powers to exclude evidence. Like state
courts, federal courts have the power to regulate attorneys practic-
ing before them.6 4 Federal courts may discipline attorneys who vio-
late the rules of professional responsibility. In fact, some courts
view the exercise of this power as an obligation: "A district court is
obliged to take measures against unethical conduct occurring in
connection with any proceeding before it."65
§ 1154 (excluding evidence of settlements) and § 1155 (excluding evidence of insurance cov-
erage) also codify judicially created exclusionary rules designed to encourage certain
behavior.
60 ABA Discipline Standards at Standard 2 (as amended) (cited in note 20).
61 44 Ill.2d 132, 254 N.E.2d 453 (1970).
62 Id. at 135-36, 254 N.E.2d at 455-56.
63 Id.
61 E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371, 378 (S.D. Tex. 1969) ("Attorneys.
who appear before a court are subject to its disciplinary power, a power which authorizes
the court to regulate the practice of law both within and without the courtroom.").
"I Musicus v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 621 F.2d 742, 744 (5th Cir. 1980). See also
Bohrod v. United States, 248 F. Supp. 559, 566 (W.D. Wisc. 1965) ("[T]he power of the
federal courts to formulate rules of evidence is not limited to the enforcement of constitu-
tional strictures. Evidence may be barred even though the circumstances in which it was
obtained do not offend the Constitution. The federal courts have the duty of 'establishing
and maintaining civilized standards of procedure and evidence.' "), quoting McNabb v.
United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943).
In general, federal district courts apply the Model Code or Model Rules by adopting
them or incorporating them into a local rule. See, e.g., Sun Studs, Inc. v. Applied Theory
Associates, Inc., 772 F.2d 1557, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1985), in which the District Court for Oregon
promulgated a local rule that substantially adopted the standards of professional conduct
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Accordingly, several federal courts in criminal cases have ex-
cluded evidence obtained in violation of the rules against commu-
nications and misrepresentation,66 and a number of decisions sug-
gest that federal courts have the authority to exclude such
evidence in civil cases as well. In Trans-Cold Express, Inc. v. Ar-
row Motor Transit, Inc.,6 7 a truck accident case, the defendant's
attorney employed an investigator who interviewed the father of
the employee-driver of the plaintiff's truck." The investigator
required of members of the Oregon State Bar, and the court of appeals held that those
standards governed the conduct of the district court's bar. See also Paul E. Iacono Struc-
tural Engineer, Inc. v. Humphrey, 722 F.2d 435, 438 (9th Cir. 1983), in which the Ninth
Circuit upheld the disqualification of an attorney in the face of arguments that the rules of
professional responsibility applicable to lawyers practicing before the district court did not
include the provisions of the Model Code. The court said, "We disagree with the conclusion
that to have force the Model Code must be specifically adopted," id. at 438, and noted that
"[i]n the absence of rules promulgated by higher authorities in the judicial system, the dis-
trict courts are free to regulate the conduct of lawyers appearing before them." Id. at 439.
Similarly, the Third Circuit applied the Model Code and Model Rules to a disqualifica-
tion case where it had not expressly adopted the Code or the Rules and where disqualifica-
tion was first raised on appeal. In re Corn Derivatives Antitrust Litigation, 748 F.2d 157 (3d
Cir. 1984). The court in Corn Derivatives wrote:
One of the inherent powers of any federal court is the admission and discipline of at-
torneys practicing before it ...
• ..Our Court of Appeals has never formally adopted any particular formulation
of the standards of professional conduct. The lack of formal standards, however, can-
not mean that the attorneys appearing before us do not have ethical obligations and
duties. .... [T]he vast majority of courts in this country have adopted, with slight
variation, the Code of Professional Responsibility promulgated by the American Bar
Association, and thus, the basic principles of an attorney's duties and responsibilities
are clear and easily applied. Further, since ...the attorneys ...are bound by the
duties imposed by the bars of their respective states, they have notice of the common
principles against conflicts of interests imbedded in the national standards of current
practice.
Id. at 160. Hence, federal courts need not adopt local rules incorporating the Model Code or
Model Rules in order to be able to apply the Code or Rules in cases of attorney misconduct,
though of course such adoption would make their applicability even clearer.
" For example, see United States v. Thomas, 474 F.2d 110, 112 (10th Cir. 1973) (hold-
ing that a statement obtained by an attorney from the defendant without notifying the
defendant's attorney of the interview may not be admitted as evidence); United States v.
Batchelor, 484 F. Supp 812 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (granting new trial to defendant because attor-
ney interviewed him without obtaining prior consent of defendant's counsel); United States.
v. Rogers, 751 F.2d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding evidence could be excluded that was
obtained through misleading and threatening statements by government attorney).
As discussed below in part III-A, the rationales for extending the rule to criminal cases
are weaker than for civil cases, and therefore this comment recommends excepting criminal
cases from the proposed exclusionary rule.
6 440 F.2d 1216 (7th Cir. 1971).
61 Id. While the decision does not state that the investigator worked for the defen-
dant's attorney (rather than for the defendant himself), this inference is reasonable because
the court shows concern both with the deception and with the lack of notification to the
plaintiff's attorney. Id. at 1218. The latter would only be relevant to an attorney's agent,
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failed to notify the plaintiff's attorney of the interview. The father
believed that the investigator represented his son's employer, the
plaintiff, and the investigator did nothing to dispel this impression.
The trial court excluded the evidence because it had been decep-
tively obtained,"' and the Seventh Circuit upheld the decision, not-
ing that "the desirability of deterring improper investigative con-
duct was a factor which the court could properly consider in the
exercise of its discretion to exclude the evidence. '70
In addition, some cases have concluded that the exclusion of
an attorney's work product is an appropriate sanction where the
attorney has been disqualified from a case for violations of the
rules of professional responsibility. In the Second Circuit case of
Ceramco, Inc. v. Lee Pharmaceuticals,71 for example, the plain-
tiff's attorney telephoned several of the defendant's employees,
who were not told the attorney's identity or purpose, and obtained
nonprivileged, relevant, and accurate information concerning juris-
diction. The defendant appealed from the lower court's denial of
defendant's motion to disqualify the plaintiff's attorney for his
conduct. While the Second Circuit said the attorney's behavior was
"not to be commended," it found the evidence did not prejudice
the attorney's opponent; thus it did not disqualify the attorney's
firm from the case and declined to penalize the client by "preclud-
ing reliance on counsel's work product. '72 In this way, the court
implied that if the improperly obtained information were suffi-
ciently prejudicial, it could be barred from evidence or from use by
since in general there are no rules preventing non-lawyers from talking to parties absent
notice to the latter's attorneys.
41 See id. at 1219. The court suggested that the investigator's acts implicated the rules
of professional responsibility even though the investigator was not an attorney. See id. at
1219 n.9. Such a result follows from Model Code DR 1-102, which prohibits an attorney
from violating a Disciplinary Rule, circumventing a Disciplinary Rule through the actions of
another, and engaging in dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. Similarly, Rule 8.4
of the Model Rules declares that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to violate or
attempt to violate the rules of professional conduct, or to knowingly assist or induce another
to do so, or to do so through the acts of another. Thus, both the Rules and the Code pro-
hibit attorneys from circumventing the rules of professional responsibility through the acts
of others.
70 Trans-Cold Express, 440 F.2d at 1219. Although the trial court excluded the evi-
dence by exercising its discretion with respect to the admissibility of expert testimony, the
Court of Appeals noted that the trial court's decision was based largely on its perception of
unethical behavior. Id.
71 510 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1975).
72 Id. at 271. See also First Wis. Mortg. Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 584 F.2d 201, 204-05
(7th Cir. 1978) (rejecting per se rule that would exclude work product of any attorney who is
disqualified for violations of the rules of ethics, but acknowledging that exclusion may be
appropriate in some cases).
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those represented by the attorney.
Thus, it appears that both federal and state courts have the
power to exclude evidence obtained by an attorney or his agent in
violation of the rules of professional responsibility. The next sec-
tion of this comment discusses the benefits to be gained from
courts' exercise of their exclusionary power.
B. Benefits of Exclusion of Evidence Obtained in Violation of the
Rules of Professional Responsibility
1. Deterrence. Exclusion undermines the incentives for attor-
neys to engage in behavior that violates the rules of professional
responsibility in order to obtain evidence for their clients. Evi-
dence obtained in violation of the rules will be excluded; therefore,
it will have no value at trial and little value in settlement negotia-
tions. The degree of deterrence depends, as a first approximation,
on the ratio between the expected cost of being detected (the
probability of detection multiplied by the cost of detection) and
the value of the evidence improperly obtained. Under an exclusion-
ary rule, the cost of being detected is the value of the evidence
excluded. An exclusionary rule may not be a perfect deterrent,
since the probability of detection is less than 1; but the rule can
significantly reduce incentives to misbehave, since the cost of ex-
clusion may be much higher than the cost of suffering sanctions for
misconduct, and, more importantly, because the probability of de-
tection should increase a great deal when opposing attorneys can
benefit from reporting violations that result in exclusion of
evidence.
Exclusion of evidence has been recognized as an appropriate
means of deterring improper conduct. 3 In fourth amendment
cases, the Supreme Court has recognized deterrence of illegal po-
lice conduct as a legitimate rationale for excluding evidence that
has been unconstitutionally obtained: "[T]he [exclusionary] rule is
calculated to prevent. . . Its purpose is to deter-to compel re-
spect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively avail-
able way-by removing the incentive to disregard it. ' ' 74 The Court
7 See, e.g., Trans-Cold Express, 440 F.2d at 1219 ("Entirely apart from the possible
probative value of the statement, the desirability of deterring improper investigative con-
duct was a factor which the court could properly consider in the exercise of its discretion to
exclude the evidence.").
74 Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217; Terry, 392 U.S. at 12 ("Ever since its inception, the rule
excluding evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment has been recognized as a
principal mode of discouraging lawless police conduct.").
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has accepted deterrence as a legitimate rationale in the constitu-
tional cases because no other effective method of protecting the
relevant constitutional rights exists.7" Similarly, given the ineffec-
tive alternatives to exclusion in enforcing the rules of professional
responsibility (discussed in part II-D below) and the importance of
deterring conduct that violates these rules, an exclusionary rule
seems justified.
In fact, the likelihood that the rule will deter unethical con-
duct by attorneys is far greater than the likelihood that an exclu-
sionary rule will deter improper police conduct. In the context of
professional responsibility, the rule operates directly on the attor-
ney violating the rule by damaging his case and affecting his liveli-
hood; in contrast, it is highly questionable whether a police officer
has sufficient interest in the outcome of a criminal trial that the
prospect of exclusion will influence his behavior.76
Adopting the exclusionary rule in the professional responsibil-
7' Mapp, 367 U.S. at 652-53. See also People v. Cahan, 44 Cal.2d 434, 445, 282 P.2d
905, 911-12 (1955). A damage action against the police for violations of fourth amendment
rights, for example, has been viewed as an insufficient deterrent because many victims could
not bear the burden of initiating such proceedings and because individual officers would
probably not have to pay the damages in any case because the state would indemnify them.
See Wayne F. LaFave and Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 3.1(c) at 81 (one-vol. ed.
1985). The same arguments suggest that it would be insufficient to give the party harmed by
a violation of the rules of professional responsibility a damage action against the culpable
attorney. While the attorney might not be able to pass liability to his employer as a police
officer could, a civil litigant would likely be no more able than a criminal defendant to
shoulder the burdens of initiating and pursuing a separate action for misrepresentation or
overreaching. Further, the Model Rules specifically state that the Rules are not to be used
as a source of civil liability. Model Rules Scope [6].
16 Consider, for example, Chief Justice Burger's criticisms of the exclusionary rule in
Stone, 428 U.S. at 498-500 (concurring opinion), questioning whether the rule's use in crimi-
nal cases in fact deters, since it does not directly sanction the police officer for his violation
of the Constitution.
The recognition that deterrence increases when a violator has a greater interest in the
outcome of the proceedings finds support in a line of Supreme Court cases involving the use
of unconstitutionally obtained evidence in proceedings other than criminal trials. In these
cases, the Court has developed a "zone of primary interest" test to measure whether exclu-
sion of the evidence is sufficiently likely to deter future police violations to justify applying
the exclusionary rule. If the proceeding falls within "the offending officer's zone of primary
interest," the Court will conclude that the police would be sufficiently deterred from future
violations, and it will exclude the evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433,
458 (1976) (holding that IRS assessment was outside "zone of primary interest" of city po-
lice officer who turned over records seized in gambling raid to IRS); INS v. Lopez-Mendoza,
468 U.S. 1032, 1053 (1984) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that evidence unconstitutionally
seized by immigration officers should be excluded in civil deportation hearing since deporta-
tion is within officers' zone of primary interest). Under this test, evidence improperly ob-
tained by an attorney surely should be excluded: a lawyer's livelihood depends on his suc-
cess in trials, so exclusion of evidence improperly obtained will substantially reduce his
incentive to act improperly.
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ity context will have another strong deterrent effect: the rule will
create incentives for attorneys to identify and report violations by
other attorneys. A major problem with the current system of disci-
plinary enforcement, as noted previously, is the lack of incentives
to discover and report violations of the rules. The opportunity to
argue for exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the rules
against communication and misrepresentation will be beneficial to
the attorney's client because it may be used to eliminate evidence
unfavorable to the client. Hence, the rule will create considerable
incentives for attorneys to self-police within the adversarial pro-
cess, since direct benefits to themselves and their clients may re-
sult if they identify and report violations. Unlike the current sys-
tem, the exclusionary rule will facilitate self-regulation by
attorneys, since under it violations of the rules of professional re-
sponsibility will be more likely to be discovered and the expected
cost of such violations would be greater than the minimal sanctions
now imposed.
2. Judicial Integrity. A second rationale for excluding evi-
dence obtained in violation of the rules of professional responsibil-
ity is that by admitting such evidence, a court participates in the
improper behavior and in effect condones it. This brings the court
and the judicial system into disrepute. The rationale has been used
to justify the exclusionary rule for constitutional violations: "When
. ..the very purpose of an illegal search and seizure is to get evi-
dence to introduce at a trial, the success of the lawless venture
depends entirely on the court's lending its aid by allowing the evi-
dence to be introduced. '77 The same argument applies to viola-
tions of the rules of professional responsibility: unless the court
lends its aid by allowing the introduction of evidence procured in
violation of the rules, the improper behavior will be completely un-
successful. If the court allows the introduction of the evidence, the
court, as well as the attorney, may be publicly perceived as unfair
and unjust.
Admittedly, judicial sanctioning of unconstitutional acts is
more serious than judicial sanctioning of professional violations.
Nevertheless, state supreme courts and the federal courts are re-
sponsible for disciplining attorneys, and they should not reward
behavior that violates the rules by admitting its fruits as evidence
in the courtroom. In response to such admission, the public is
likely to hold the courts responsible for the unfairness of a system
7 Cahan, 44 Cal.2d at 445, 282 P.2d at 912.
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that condones such behavior. By forbidding the use of evidence ob-
tained in violation of the rules in their courtrooms, judges prevent
the deterioration of public respect for the courts.
C. Costs of the Exclusionary Rule
The exclusionary rule's benefits of deterring attorney miscon-
duct, encouraging self-policing, and helping maintain judicial in-
tegrity must be weighed against the rule's costs. The primary cost
of exclusion of evidence obtained by violating the rules is that it
removes probative evidence from the court and jury.78 This may be
a significant cost, for exclusion may interfere with a central func-
tion of trials: to ascertain the truth. In some cases, the conse-
quence of exclusion will be severe: a wrong decision will be reached
because part of the truth is kept from the finder of fact.
But one should not overestimate the loss in probative evidence
that will result from an exclusionary rule. As argued above in part
I-C, there are strong reasons to think that statements a person
makes without knowing the listener is an attorney, or on the basis
of misrepresentations by the attorney, will tend to be unreliable.9
The person may not be as careful in exercising his memory or nar-
rating his story as he would be if the attorney has made his iden-
tity known; and it is unclear whether knowing one is speaking to
an opposing attorney increases or decreases one's sincerity. In
some ways, therefore, the exclusion of evidence obtained in viola-
tion of the rules of professional responsibility does not suffer from
one of the defects of the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation
of the rights of criminal defendants: namely, barring highly proba-
tive evidence. In fact, the rule in the professional responsibility
context can act in concert with the hearsay rule to screen a class of
evidence of questionable reliability.80
Moreover, whatever costs there are should be short-lived. As it
7 Exclusion may impede truthfinding, Leon, 468 U.S. at 906-07, by denying the jury
reliable and probative evidence, Stone, 428 U.S. at 489-90.
71 See note 42 above and text accompanying and following.
" One might argue that some of the constitutional prohibitions-against confessions or
identifications obtained without counsel, at least-rest on a judgment that such tactics will
produce results of questionable validity. Wade, 388 U.S. at 228-32. But Miranda did not
single out only those confessions likely to be false. See 384 U.S. at 436. And in the search
and seizure context, where the exclusionary rule has received the most criticism, it is clear
that the violation does not undercut the reliability of the evidence. Indeed, one of the major
criticisms of the rule is that it will prevent highly probative evidence from coming to the
attention of the fact finder, thus allowing a guilty criminal to go free. See note 78 and ac-
companying text above.
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becomes clear to attorneys that evidence obtained through viola-
tions of the rules of professional responsibility will be excluded,
and as increased self-policing renders the likelihood of detection
high, most attorneys will be motivated to obtain evidence through
proper channels. Hence, even if the short-term costs in reduced
accuracy are substantial, in the long run the costs should be mini-
neal because attorneys will adjust their behavior to the new exclu-
sionary rule.
On the other hand, if courts fail to provide disincentives and
continue to admit evidence obtained by improper shortcuts, the in-
cidence of such improper conduct will probably remain high. By
allowing attorneys to violate the rules without suffering sanctions,
the courts give the parties represented by attorneys who misbe-
have an advantage over those whose attorneys obey the rules.8 1 Re-
acting to this unfair advantage, even the responsible lawyer may be
tempted to violate the rules in order to neutralize his opponent's
use of evidence obtained through violation of the rules. Thus, un-
less such evidence is excluded or some alternative disincentive to
violating the rules is provided, the advantages of obtaining evi-
dence through rules violations will encourage violations.
Of course, adopting an exclusionary rule may result in harm to
the attorney's client-who may be completely unaware of the at-
torney's misbehavior and may not in any way have approved of it.
The client may be substantially worse off because of the exclusion
of the evidence, through no apparent fault or misbehavior of his
own. At first glance, exclusion thus seems to impose an unjust pen-
alty on the misbehaving attorney's client. But, emphasizing the
agency relationship between client and attorney, the Supreme
Court has rejected such an argument under the more serious cir-
cumstance of dismissal of the cause of action due to an attorney's
conduct:
There is certainly no merit to the contention that dismissal of
petitioner's claim because of his counsel's unexcused conduct
imposes an unjust penalty on the client. Petitioner voluntarily
chose this attorney as his representative in the action, and he
cannot now avoid the consequences of the acts or omissions of
this freely selected agent.82
The question is really which of two innocent parties should
bear the loss from conduct that violates the rules. Since the party
' White, 1980 Amer. Bar Found. Research J. at 927 (cited in note 24).
82 Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 633-34 (1962).
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whose attorney improperly obtained evidence freely chose that at-
torney, it seems more just to impose the costs on him. He should
suffer the consequences of his attorney's actions, rather than the
opposing party who did not choose the misbehaving attorney as his
representative. Such a rule also places on the party relatively more
capable of preventing the improper behavior an incentive to do so:
the client can be careful to retain a scrupulous attorney and to
ensure that the attorney he retains remains scrupulous.
Furthermore, exclusion of evidence has less severe effects on
the client than other sanctions that could be and have been im-
posed, such as disqualifying the attorney."' In some cases, where
the evidence could not have been obtained without violating the
rules of professional responsibility, the attorney's client is in the
same position he would have been in had his attorney not broken
the rules: he simply is unable to make use of evidence that he had
no right to obtain in the first place."4 Finally, the client can sue the
attorney for malpractice if exclusion of the evidence caused a less
favorable result in the case.8 5
An additional cost is that the rule could be used as a litigation
tactic to harass opposing counsel, as many discovery rules cur-
rently are used. 8 Simply alleging that evidence has been obtained
83 See Ceramco, 510 F.2d at 271 (indicating that disqualification is an alternative).
84 See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984), where the Supreme Court justified the
independent source exception to the exclusionary rule (discussed below in notes 98-99 and
accompanying text) on the ground that "the interest of society in deterring unlawful police
conduct and the public interest in having juries receive all probative evidence of a crime are
properly balanced by putting the police in the same, not a worse, position than they would
have been in if no police error or misconduct had occurred."
85 The threat of being sued for malpractice should act as a powerful incentive for the
attorney not to violate the rules of professional responsibility when an exclusionary sanction
is in force, since the attorney will have to pay the costs of defending himself against a mal-
practice suit and, if he loses, may be liable for the value of his client's suit. It is true that the
probability of losing the malpractice suit will be small, because in order to prove malprac-
tice the client will have to demonstrate that the attorney did not exercise reasonable care in
his handling of the case or did not possess or use the minimum special knowledge and abil-
ity of an attorney. W. Page Keeton, Dan B. Dobbs, Robert E. Keeton, and David G. Owen,
Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts 185-86 (5th ed. 1984). Since the cause of action is
essentially negligence, the client, in addition, will have to show that this failure by his attor-
ney, leading to the exclusion of material evidence, proximately caused the harm (the loss of
the lawsuit, or a less favorable settlement).
Nevertheless, although the risk of loss is slight, the amount of money at stake will often
be quite large, making the potential cost significant, and thus the threat of suit should pose
a substantial deterrent. Aside from the costs of the suit and the possibility of liability, mal-
practice suits damage the attorney's reputation, injuring his future business.
86 Examples of such abusive discovery tactics include huge requests for documents and
endless interrogatories. See Federal Judicial Center, Survey of Literature on Discovery from
1970 to the Present: Expressed Dissatisfactions and Proposed Reforms 23, 49, 52-53, 67
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by violating the rules would provide an effective delaying tactic by
requiring inquiry into the method of obtainment. Further, the ac-
cusation may bring an attorney into disrepute, and it likely will
embarrass him in front of his client. To counter this problem,
courts could impose fines or other sanctions for falsely alleging im-
proper behavior when there is no basis for the allegations."7 Such
fines or sanctions may be only seldom imposed, but the threat of
sanctions together with the injury to attorneys' relations with col-
leagues may be sufficient to prevent many attorneys from making
false allegations.
A final disadvantage of the exclusionary rule is that its appli-
cation may be uncertain and vague. There will be difficult cases
where it is unclear whether an attorney has in fact violated the
rules, and it may be difficult in some circumstances for attorneys
to determine beforehand whether their planned conduct will vio-
late the rules. For example, in negotiations the line between actual
misrepresentation and puffing is very thin and thus difficult to
draw. Nevertheless, there will be many easy cases in which the rule
can be enforced with little uncertainty, as for example when an
attorney talks to the opposing party without informing the party's
counsel. Furthermore, courts enforce many rules where the result
in all cases is not clear in advance. As courts begin to enforce the
rule, the common law will develop and uncertainty as to the exclu-
sionary rule's parameters will diminish.8"
Overall, the rule's benefits-deterring violations of the rules of
professional responsibility, encouraging self-policing of such viola-
tions, and preserving judicial integrity-appear to outweigh its
costs. Moreover, exclusion is preferable to suggested alternative
sanctions, as discussed below. Furthermore, the costs of the rule
(1978).
The Model Rules expressly prohibit counsel from using the Rules as a tactical weapon
in litigation. Model Rules Scope [6]. Surely this does not mean, however, that attorneys may
not request, and courts may not grant, sanctions for violations of the Rules that will have a
strategic effect on pending litigation. For example, the courts disqualify attorneys for viola-
tions of the Rules without questioning whether this sanction itself violates this provision of
the Rules. See notes 93-96 and accompanying text below. Yet disqualification certainly may
delay litigation~and impede the cause of the client whose attorney has been disqualified.
There is no reason to assume that the proposed exclusionary rule has a greater potential for
tactical abuse by attorneys than does the power to disqualify.
"' The courts clearly would have such power under the provisions of Fed. Rule Civil
Proc. 11 and analogous state rules.
88 Compare Judge Easterbrook's comment on the development of fourth amendment
case law in Gumz v. Morrisette, 772 F.2d 1395, 1407 (7th Cir. 1985) (concurring opinion)
("There is now a tremendous body of precedent dealing with searches and seizures, and
these cases furnish rules that ought to be sufficient guidance in a case such as this.").
1986] 1423
The University of Chicago Law Review
may be mitigated by carving out the exceptions discussed in part
III-A.
D. The Inadequate Alternatives to Exclusion
The two main alternatives to the exclusionary rule, citation for
contempt and disqualification, are both inferior. The ABA has ar-
gued that conduct that violates some of the rules of professional
responsibility may constitute contempt," noting that "the con-
tempt power is directed toward acts which threaten to obstruct
justice. . . or toward acts which tend to bring the court into disre-
pute."90 However, there are several reasons why contempt citation
of attorneys who seek to introduce evidence obtained in violation
of the rules of professional responsibility is inappropriate.
First, courts have been reluctant to use their contempt power
to attack conduct that is not a direct affront to the court. While
violation of the Model Code or Rules tends to lessen judicial integ-
rity generally, the contempt sanction usually is reserved for con-
duct that "directly tend[s] to bring the court into disrepute."'"
The courts have generally been unwilling to exercise their con-
tempt power unless faced with conduct such as disobeying a judi-
cial order or creating a disturbance in court. Judicial integrity is
undermined when a court effectively condones violations of the
rules of professional responsibility by failing to provide meaningful
sanctions for them; but the violations themselves do not constitute
a direct affront to the authority of the court.
Even if courts are willing to use their contempt power in re-
sponse to "indirect" threats to their integrity, citation for con-
tempt probably will not be an effective deterrent. Although the
cost to the attorney held in contempt might be substantial, the
likelihood of detection and punishment by citation is substantially
less than under an exclusionary rule.92 Therefore, the contempt ci-
tation seems to be both a less likely and a less effective mechanism
for remedying violations of the rules of professional responsibility
than is the proposed exclusionary rule.
A second alternative to exclusion is disqualification of the of-
fending attorney from the case.93 This alternative would deter at-
89 ABA Standing Comm. on Professional Discipline and the Center for Professional
Responsibility, The Judicial Response to Lawyer Misconduct V.4 (1984).
90 Id. at VI.3.
91 Id. at VI.5 (emphasis added).
92 See note 76 above and text accompanying and following.
93 See Ceramco, 510 F.2d at 271.
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torneys from violations of the rules, since an attorney could not
reap the benefits of his work through charges to his client once he
had been disqualified. In addition, disqualification might create a
sufficient incentive for opposing counsel to uncover and disclose
the violation, since the result would be that the attorney's client
will find himself without counsel at what may be a critical stage in
the litigation. But this is a rather harsh response, for it deprives
the attorney's client of his choice of counsel, in which he has a
substantial interest:9 certainly greater in general than the interest
in having a particular piece of evidence admitted.
In addition, disqualification is the appropriate remedy only
where a conflict of interest exists "such that continued representa-
tion by chosen counsel clearly prejudice[s] the rights of the oppos-
ing party."' 5 Disqualification in such a case prevents the conflict of
interest that results when an attorney represents one party to liti-
gation when he has a prior relation with the opposing party. In
contrast, when evidence is obtained by violating the rules of pro-
fessional responsibility, the issue focuses not on the attorney but
on the evidence. The analogue to excluding (disqualifying) the im-
properly retained attorney from the case is excluding the improp-
erly obtained evidence from the case. Finally, if the only remedy is
to disqualify the attorney who improperly obtains evidence, the
new attorney may still be able to use the evidence, and the oppos-
ing party will have suffered the same harm. Hence, disqualifica-
tion, like disciplinary proceedings and contempt, is a less appropri-
ate and less effective remedy than exclusion.9
" While parties do not have an absolute right to the counsel of their choice, see Rich-
ardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 105 S. Ct. 2757 (1985) (counsel disqualified for misconduct),
they do have a substantial interest in choosing their own counsel. See Cossette v. Country
Style Donuts, Inc., 647 F.2d 526, 530 (5th Cir. 1981); In re Northern Dist. of Cal., Dalkon
Shield, etc., 693 F.2d 847, 851 (9th Cir. 1982) ("[T]he right of litigants to choose their own
counsel is a right not lightly to be brushed aside.").
Federal courts have applied the qualified right to counsel of one's choice, found in the
sixth amendment, to civil cases. For example, in In re American Cable Publications, Inc.,
768 F.2d 1194 (10th Cir. 1985), a contract dispute involved an attorney, Frascona, who was a
defendant and third-party plaintiff, and who hired his law partner to represent him. An
opposing party sought to have Frascona's attorney disqualified on the grounds of violation
of DR 5-101(B). The court found DR 5-101(B) not to preclude such representation, since
the law partner would not act as a witness in the case. The court stated: "We believe that
important Sixth Amendment right to counsel principles are at issue in this situation. Fras-
cona has an unquestioned right to self-representation. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654. A corollary to
that right is the right of representation by counsel of his choosing." Id. at 1196. See also
Bottaro v. Hatton Associates, 680 F.2d 895, 897 (2d Cir. 1982) (right to counsel of one's
choice "can be overridden only where compelling reasons exist").
:5 Ceramco, 510 F.2d at 271.
' Likewise, fines or suspensions that do not impede the attorney's performance in the
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III. IMPLEMENTING THE EXCLUSION OF IMPROPERLY OBTAINED
EVIDENCE
A. The Exclusionary Rule in Practice: Three Exceptions
One can limit the costs from exclusion of evidence by imple-
menting three exceptions to the proposed exclusionary rule. The
first two exceptions, the "independent source" exception and the
inevitable discovery exception, are modeled after the exceptions to
the exclusionary rules for constitutional violations.97 The third ex-
ception, limiting application of the proposed exclusionary rule to
civil cases only, is based on the practical recognition that the costs
may outweigh the benefits of this exclusionary rule in criminal
cases.
The first, the "independent source" exception, was originally
announced by the Supreme Court in Silverthorne Lumber Co., Inc.
v. United States,9 8 a case involving an unconstitutional seizure.
The "independent source" exception provides that evidence ob-
tained improperly may not be used at all, but the facts obtained
through that evidence are not "sacred and inaccessible. If knowl-
edge of them is gained from an independent source they may be
proved like any others. . . -"9 The Silverthorne rule leaves the
prosecutor no worse off than if the illegal search had not oc-
curred-he has only the facts and evidence legally obtained-but
the illegal search does not limit the use of legitimately obtained
evidence. If facts are provable independent of the evidence ob-
tained in violation of the rules of professional responsibility, the
legitimately obtained facts should be admitted. The opposing
party is not unfairly harmed or prejudiced by admission of these
facts into evidence, since they were not wrongfully acquired and
would have been available and admissible had no improper behav-
case at hand are not adequate deterrents, as they create little incentive for disclosure of the
violation by opposing counsel.
'1 Another possible exception would allow admission of improperly obtained state-
ments for the purposes of impeachment. The Supreme Court has upheld admission into
evidence of statements unconstitutionally obtained from a defendant when the defendant
affirmatively resorted "to perjurious testimony in reliance on the Government's disability to
challenge his credibility." Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1953).
98 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920). The Court held that unconstitutionally seized books and
papers (obtained without a warrant) could not be subpoenaed for the grand jury, nor could
photos of them be used to obtain knowledge upon which to frame a subpoena. The contents
of the papers were constitutionally protected, but the government could use those contents
if it obtained them from a source independent of the illegal search.
9 Id. at 392. See also Bynum v. United States, 274 F.2d 767, 767 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (per
curiam).
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ior occurred.
A second applicable exception is the "inevitable" or "ultimate
discovery" exception, adopted by the Supreme Court in Nix v.
Williams.'"0 Under this exception, if the party opposing exclusion
"can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the infor-
mation ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by
lawful means . . . then the deterrence rationale has so little basis
that the evidence should be received."'' 1 The exception is particu-
larly applicable to physical evidence, the location of which is un-
known. Nix involved the missing body of a homicide victim, which
would have been found by a search party looking nearby had the
defendant not told the police its location.
In applying the "inevitable discovery" exception to violations
of the rules of professional responsibility, courts should draw a dis-
tinction between statements and physical evidence, applying the
exception with regard to the latter but not the former. The excep-
tion should not apply to statements since it is almost impossible to
demonstrate that a statement would "inevitably" have been dis-
covered in the exact same form if the attorney had complied with
the rules; as noted in part I-C, a person's statements may differ
depending on whether he knows that the person to whom he is
talking is an attorney. Thus, such evidence should be excluded.
Further, it would be difficult to prove that the "facts" presented
by those statements would inevitably have been discovered absent
attorney misbehavior. Where the facts might be discovered
through means complying with the rules, the violation of the rules
often constitutes a shortcut that saves the attorney (and client)
time and money. If courts admitted such evidence on the ground
that it would inevitably have been discovered, they would en-
courage the taking of shortcuts that violate the rules of profes-
sional responsibility. Hence, where the improperly obtained evi-
dence is a statement, this exception should not be allowed. Where
the evidence is physical, the court should admit it but only after
examining carefully whether the evidence truly would "inevitably"
have been found.
The third exception to the proposed exclusionary rule is that
exclusion would not be required in criminal cases. While the pro-
posed rule of exclusion could be applied in criminal cases, this
comment argues against such extension for several reasons. First,
the controversy surrounding the exclusionary rule for constitu-
100 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
101 Id. at 444 (footnote omitted).
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tional violations in criminal cases indicates that the social costs of
exclusion are very great in criminal cases. 102 Since guilty defen-
dants may go free as a result of exclusion in criminal cases, the
balancing of costs and benefits of the rule weighs less strongly in
favor of the rule. 03 The freeing of some criminals is more likely to
produce general disrespect for the law-indeed, to undermine the
very notion of "judicial integrity" that the exclusionary rule is sup-
posed to servel 04-than is the use of such rules in civil cases, where
at worst exclusion will allow some tortfeasors to avoid paying for
their non-criminal torts. Arguably, these tortfeasors incur sufficient
penalties for their conduct simply by going to trial. The public is
more likely to be upset by the spectre of unpunished criminals
running rampant in society than by the knowledge that some
tortfeasors escape paying damages. However rational or irrational
this public opinion of the judicial system, it is a factor that the
exclusionary rule takes into account under the rubric of "judicial
integrity.' '1 0
5
Second, not only will the costs of each inaccurate result be
greater in criminal cases (a free criminal versus a liability-free
tortfeasor), but it is more likely that an inaccurate result will fol-
low in criminal cases from exclusion of a given piece of evidence.
This is because the burden of proof necessary to establish liability
is greater in criminal cases-beyond a reasonable doubt, as op-
posed to the preponderance of the evidence. The corollary of that
standard is that a criminal defendant need create fewer doubts
than a civil defendant in order to escape liability. Thus the impor-
tance of each piece of evidence is magnified.
Third, exclusion of unethically obtained evidence may have
less of an incentive effect on the attorneys in criminal cases. 06
Contingency fee lawyers, who handle a significant percentage of
"' For general discussion of the criticism of the exclusionary rule as socially costly, see
Wayne R. LaFave and Jerold H. Israel, 1 Criminal Procedure at 136-41 (1984). For example,
consider the argument that the exclusionary rule in criminal cases leads to a general disre-
spect for the law and the administration of justice because it provides the "spectacle of
courts letting the guilty go free," Dallin H. Oaks, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 665, 737 (1970), quoting
Monrad Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the Police, 52 J. Crim. L.C. &
P.S. 255, 257 (1961). See also Stone, 428 U.S. at 491.
"0" Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 413 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
104 See part II-B-2 above, discussing the exclusionary rule's role in protecting judicial
integrity.
,01 See id.
' Compare note 76 and accompanying text above, arguing that while incentives cre-
ated by exclusion due to violations of the rules of professional responsibility are clear as to
attorneys, incentives to police officers in constitutional cases are highly questionable.
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civil cases, collect no money if they lose. No such direct financial
risk operates on the government lawyer in criminal cases. Of
course, there are deterrents to poor performance by government
lawyers as well, but a line between civil and criminal cases repre-
sents a first approximation of the likely deterrent effects of the
rule in an individual case. The administrative costs of finding a
perfect "fit" (i.e., tailoring the rule only to specific cases in which it
is likely to deter) would likely overwhelm its benefits.
Fourth, application of the rule to criminal cases could, in ef-
fect, result in a requirement that counsel must be present in order
for a party to waive counsel once the sixth amendment right to
counsel has attached. This is because the prosecutorial authorities
would be unable to speak with the accused, even if the accused
initiated the communication, without informing his attorney in ad-
vance and allowing him to be present. To date, the Supreme Court
has specifically declined to rule that a waiver of the right to coun-
sel cannot be made absent counsel.107
Finally, it should be noted that several courts already have
ruled on whether to exclude evidence in criminal cases obtained by
violating the rules of professional responsibility. In general, state
courts have ruled against excluding the evidence. 10 8 Federal courts
have looked with more favor on the remedy of exclusion in crimi-
nal cases.109 Given the controversial nature of applying the pro-
posed exclusionary rule in criminal cases, this comment suggests
that the rule be limited to civil cases, where the rule's benefits
more clearly outweigh its costs.
B. The Scope of the Exclusion: Fruit of the Poisonous Tree
A final, key issue in applying this rule will be determining the
scope of exclusion. For example, in the hypothetical described in
107 Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1044-46 (1982); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S.
477, 483-85 (1980); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 405-06, 413 (1977).
,08 For example, in People v. Green, 405 Mich. 273, 274 N.W.2d 448 (1979), the Michi-
gan Supreme Court refused to reverse a conviction or require a new trial where the trial
court had admitted evidence of a conversation between the prosecutor and the defendant
initiated at the defendant's request, but without the prior consent of the defendant's lawyer.
The court held that the defendant had "knowingly and understandingly" waived his right to
an attorney. 274 N.W.2d at 454. See also Lofton v. State, 471 So.2d 665 (Fla. App. 1985)
(same); Pannell v. State, 666 S.W.2d 96 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
,09 In Thomas, 474 F.2d at 112, the Tenth Circuit held that a statement obtained by an
attorney from the defendant without notifying the defendant's attorney of the interview
may not be offered into evidence (although the court refused to reverse the result in this
case, since the rule was first being announced). See also Rogers, 751 F.2d at 1079; Batchelor,
484 F. Supp. at 813.
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part I-A, the exclusionary rule prevents the use in court of the
statement of the Inventor. Whether the scope of the rule should
extend to exclude information in the statement itself is unclear.
For example, if the Inventor gave the name of a person, previously
unknown, who also worked in the production of the widgets, and
Attorney then went and interviewed him (after giving notice to
Counsel, pursuant to the rules of professional responsibility),
would the identity of this person and his statement be admissible?
The Supreme Court, in constitutional exclusionary cases, has held
such evidence inadmissible. In Silverthorne,110 the Court held in-
valid a subpoena issued on the basis of information acquired
through an illegal search. The illegally obtained evidence could not
be used directly, and hence, according to the Court, it also could
not be used indirectly. The Court held that the exclusionary rule
extended to all evidence derived from the unconstitutional search,
including evidence subsequently obtained through the use of the
information acquired during the search.' Courts have referred to
this derivative evidence as the "fruit of the poisonous tree.""' 2
Fruit of the poisonous tree should also be excluded where the
evidence has been obtained by violating the rules of professional
responsibility, since allowing some uses of the evidence will sub-
stantially weaken the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule. For
example, in the case described above, in the absence of a broad
exclusionary rule barring derivative evidence, Attorney could sub-
sequently depose Inventor, as well as the third witness, and would
derive all the benefits of his violations of the rules. He therefore
would not be deterred from repeating such behavior. As noted by
the Supreme Court, "[tihe essence of a provision forbidding the
acquisition of evidence in a certain way is not that merely evidence
so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not
be used at all." '" 3 The purpose of an exclusionary rule is to prevent
the misbehaving party from benefiting from his misbehavior. To
accomplish this goal effectively, the rule must exclude all the ill-
gotten gains from that misbehavior."'
110 251 U.S. at 385.
"' Id. at 392.
312 On excluding this evidence, see Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 477-78
(1963); Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 222 (1968); Nardone v. United States, 308
U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
,,3 Silverthorne, 251 U.S. at 392.
"4 It should be noted that excluding this derivative evidence will reduce the clarity of
the exclusionary rule: there will always be hard cases, no matter where the courts draw the
line of inadmissibility. This lack of clarity leads to uncertainty and is a cost of any exclu-
sionary rule.
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CONCLUSION
Courts should adopt a rule excluding evidence obtained by vi-
olating the rules of professional responsibility. They have the
power to adopt such a rule, and by doing so they will deter im-
proper behavior, create incentives for attorneys themselves to po-
lice the rules, and protect the integrity of the judicial process. Al-
ternative methods of deterring misbehavior and remedying its
harms are ineffective: disciplinary proceedings are expensive, occur
rarely, and even more rarely impose significant sanctions; citations
for contempt and disqualifications of attorneys are inappropriate
and may be less effective than exclusion. A rule of exclusion likely
would lead to increased compliance with the two rules of profes-
sional responsibility discussed herein and would provide a means
for the courts to help enforce appropriate standards of professional
conduct. Adoption of such a rule would be a substantial improve-
ment over the status quo, under which no effective sanction
against such behavior exists.
The legal profession prides itself on its ability to regulate it-
self; it should not allow self-regulation to become synonymous with
an absence of enforcement of its own rules. The Model Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct should not be mere words on paper. To be effective, rules
for self-regulation must be accompanied by workable and commen-
surate sanctions to enforce them. An exclusionary rule is such a
sanction.
Erica M. Landsberg
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